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In one of the most anticipated decisions of the 2017–18 Supreme 
Court Term, the Court was asked to decide whether a Colorado 
baker’s First Amendment rights must yield to a generally applicable 
state law prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation.1 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission arose 
from a baker’s refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple 
who were planning to wed legally in Massachusetts and host a 
reception afterwards in Denver.2 Jack Phillips, the owner of Master-
piece Cakeshop, is a devout Christian who holds a sincere belief that 
“God’s intention for marriage . . .  is that it is and should be the 
union of one man and one woman.”3 As a result of this firmly held 
conviction, Phillips will not use his baking and decorating talents to 
create wedding cakes for same-sex couples; but he will make and sell 
other types of cakes and baked goods to gay and lesbian individuals 
and couples.4 As such, Phillips informed Charlie Craig and David 
Mullins of this limitation when they entered his shop in the summer 
of 2012 and inquired about a cake for their upcoming wedding.5 
Thereafter, Craig and Mullins filed a claim with the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission alleging that Phillips discriminated against them on 
the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act.6 The Commission and the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals ruled in favor of the couple,7 and Phillips was ordered to 
provide custom wedding cakes to same-sex couples, comprehensive 
training on the public accommodations act to his staff, as well as 
fulfill other remedial measures.8 
To Phillips, the creation of a custom wedding cake is an ex-
pressive endeavor intended to celebrate the couple and their union.9 
Phillips argued that the Commission’s order, which compelled him to 
exercise his artistic talents to express a message with which he 
 
 1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018). 
 2 Id. at 1724. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 1723. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 1726. 
 9 Id. at 1728. 
WHITMORE RTP.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/20  11:18 AM 
2020] EXTENDING THE ROBERTS COURT’S AFFIRMATION 107 
disagreed, violated his free speech right.10 The Court noted that Phillips’ 
dilemma was particularly understandable given the fact that, at the 
time, Colorado did not recognize the validity of same-sex marriage,11 
and allowed some storekeepers to decline to create specific messages 
they considered offensive.12 In the end, this case presented the Justices 
with the question of whether Colorado’s use of its public accommo-
dation law to compel Phillips to engage in expressive pursuits that 
conflicted with his religious beliefs violated the First Amendment.13  
Instead of addressing the question head on, the Justices resolved 
the case by examining the manner in which the Commission treated 
Phillips’ religious objection.14 The Court ruled that the Commission 
violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment by showing 
“elements of a clear and impermissible hostility” toward Phillips’ reli-
gious viewpoint.15 Phillips, the Court said, was entitled to a “neutral 
and respectful consideration” of his objections,16 but instead was con-
fronted by commissioners who, during formal public hearings, “en-
dorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried 
into the public sphere or the commercial domain.”17 In addition, the 
Court noted the disparate treatment between the Phillips case and 
the cases of other bakers who refused to create cakes with language 
and images disapproving same-sex marriage on religious grounds.18 In 
these cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Division found no violation of 
the State’s anti-discrimination law because “each bakery was willing to 
sell other products . . . depicting Christian themes [] to the prospective 
customers.”19 Here, the Court said, “the Commission dismissed Phillips’ 
willingness to sell [other cakes and baked goods]” to Craig and Mullen.20 
Moreover, the Commission ruled against Phillips based on the theory 
that any message conveyed by the wedding cake would be attributed 
 
 10 Id. at 1726. 
 11 Id. at 1728. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 1726–27. 
 14 Id. at 1732. 
 15 Id. at 1729. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1730–31. 
 19 Id. at 1730. 
 20 Id. 
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to the couple and not the baker.21 This same line of reasoning, 
however, was not extended to the bakers who refused to adorn a 
cake with symbolism and text disapproving of same-sex unions.22 Based 
on these findings, the Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and 
effectively ruled for Phillips.23 
The Court noted that Masterpiece Cakeshop presented difficult 
questions as to the “proper reconciliation” of two foundational Consti-
tutional principles—equal rights, as expressed in the “rights and dignity 
of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but [] face discrimi-
nation when they seek goods or services,” against the “right of all 
persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amend-
ment.”24 While the Court recognized Phillips’ free speech claim, it left 
undecided whether his conduct was protected expression.25 The Court 
indicated that it “must await further elaboration in the courts” to 
determine the issue of protected expression.26 Further elaboration by 
the Supreme Court was set to occur in the 2018–19 Term with the 
case State v. Arlene’s Flowers.27 Arlene’s Flowers involved a similar 
factual pattern as the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, but, instead of a 
wedding cake, the owner of Arlene’s, Barronelle Stutzman, refused to 
create floral arrangements for a same-sex wedding ceremony.28 Like 
Phillips, Stutzman contended that her floral arrangements constituted 
protected speech because they involved “artistic decisions.”29 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court addressed that contention and ruled that the 
arrangements did not meet the constitutional standard for expressive 
conduct.30 After handing down Masterpiece Cakeshop in June, the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded Arlene’s Flowers, requesting the 
Washington court to reexamine its ruling in light of the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop decision.31   
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 1732. 
 24 Id. at 1723. 
 25 Id. at 1732. 
 26 Id. 
 27 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). 
 28 Id. at 549. 
 29 Id. at 556. 
 30 Id. at 557. 
 31 Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671, 2671 (2018). 
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Given the Court’s action in Arlene’s Flowers, it remains unclear 
exactly how the Supreme Court would have ruled on the central 
question in Masterpiece Cakeshop without a finding of religious hos-
tility by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. That said, it is clear 
that this issue will most likely return to the Court as similar cases 
have begun to bubble up around the country in state courts.32 At 
the same time, those cases will confront the strong record of support 
for individual free speech interests that the Roberts Court has devel-
oped,33 especially in cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop, where collective 
interests reflected through regulatory law conflict with individual 
expressive rights.34 This paper examines those competing interests in 
light of the Court’s active First Amendment jurisprudence and argues 
that the expansive view of the First Amendment, crafted largely by 
the conservative majority, is reshaping the analysis of free speech 
rights in a manner that largely accommodates Phillips’ claim against 
the Colorado Commission. The result would strike down the mandate 
requiring the baker to provide custom wedding cakes to same-sex 
couples as violative of Phillips’ First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
 32 See Amy Howe, Masterpiece Cakeshop Question Returns to the Supreme Court, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2018, 12:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/masterpiece-
cakeshop-question-returns-to-the-supreme-court/; Nathan Heffel, The 3 Court Cases That 
Could Pick Up Where Masterpiece Cakeshop Left Off, COLO. PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2018), 
http://www.cpr.org/news/story/the-3-court-cases-that-could-pick-up-where-masterpiece-
cakeshop-left-off; Brennan Suen, Masterpiece Cakeshop Was Just the Beginning, MEDIA 
MATTERS FOR AM. (June 5, 2018, 1:32 PM), https://www.mediamat-
ters.org/blog/2018/06/05/Masterpiece-Cakeshop-was-just-the-beginning-ADF-is-pushing-several-
other-license-to-discri/220381. 
 33 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 
94 DENV. L. REV. 553, 554 (2017); Joel M. Gora, In the Business of Free Speech: The 
Roberts Court and Citizens United, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 227, 255–56 
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016); Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Chief Justice Roberts is Reshaping 
the First Amendment, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethir-
tyeight.com/features/chief-justice-roberts-is-reshaping-the-first-amendment/. 
 34 See, e.g., Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (holding that a state 
statute that prohibited the marketing of prescriber information violated the First Amend-
ment); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (overturning Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) as inconsistent with standard First Amendment 
principles); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) 
(holding that a license notice likely violates the First Amendment). 
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I. THE ROBERTS COURT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
When Chief Justice Roberts was appointed to the Court,35 he 
inherited a body of free speech precedent built largely on the concept 
of an “ideas” marketplace.36 Under this concept, ideas naturally collide 
and foster debate37 that challenges traditional ways of thinking and 
encourages new attitudes, which are wiser than those generated in 
an environment where speech is restricted.38 While the debate this 
process produces has become highly valued for the collective benefits 
it bestows on society,39 it is fueled by a limitless supply of individual 
viewpoints and expressive activity.40 The fortification of that supply, 
through the preservation of an individual’s right to fully and freely 
participate in the public debate, is vastly important to the Roberts 
Court and largely serves as the lens through which the Court analyzes 
First Amendment claims.41 This lens has allowed the Court to signifi-
cantly expand the free speech rights of individuals, especially in areas 
such as campaign finance42 and mandatory agency fees,43 where prec-
edent has been read to limit that right. In these areas, the Court has 
overturned key precedential cases that favored collective interests over 
the freedom of the individual.44 According to Chief Justice Roberts, 
the central purpose of the First Amendment is to afford individuals 
protection against the majority’s will, as reflected in a law.45 While 
this protection is essential to democracy and the achievement of many 
other important ends, all of these interests are undermined whenever 
the state “prevents individuals from saying what they think . . . or 
compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree.”46 For the 
 
 35 Roberts was appointed in September 2005. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
 36 See, e.g., Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic 
Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 24–26 (2012). 
 37 Id. at 26. 
 38 Id. at 29–30. 
 39 Id. at 30. 
 40 Id. at 27, 30. 
 41 See infra text accompanying notes 42–49. 
 42 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 43 See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 44 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652 (1990)); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209 (1977)). 
 45 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 205–06 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 46 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
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Roberts Court, individual free speech rights are the foundation upon 
which First Amendment law is built.47 These rights serve as the 
linchpin of free speech protection and exist regardless of how useful 
the particular expression is to the democratic process,48 or whether 
the individual is a lone pamphleteer, or some entity that “spends 
`substantial amounts of money in order to communicate . . . ideas 
through sophisticated’ means.”49 
The approach to First Amendment jurisprudence embraced by 
the Roberts Court calls to mind the Court’s reasoning in Cohen v. 
California, a case involving a man who was criminally convicted for 
wearing a jacket that visibly displayed the words “Fuck the Draft.”50 
In Cohen, the State argued Cohen’s arrest and subsequent conviction 
for disturbing the peace was justified to “protect sensitive [viewers] 
from [an] otherwise unavoidable exposure to [Cohen’s] crude form of 
protest.”51 In its ruling, the Court rejected the State’s argument, con-
tending that the State had “no right to cleanse public debate” to 
accommodate the “most squeamish among us.”52 The opinion signaled 
that public discussion will include distasteful views that may well sow 
discord among individuals.53 Disagreement, and even offensive utter-
ances, the Court said, are “necessary side effects of the broader 
enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to 
achieve.”54 According to the Court, the First Amendment was designed 
to perpetuate the achievement of these values by the restraints it 
 
 47 See, e.g., id. at 2463 (ruling that “[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views 
they find objectionable violates” a foundational First Amendment principle); Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (arguing that a disclosure 
notice requirement for clinics that provide family planning and pregnancy related services 
unconstitutionally compels individuals to speak a particular message); McCutcheon, 572 U.S. 
at 206 (plurality opinion) (holding that “[t]he whole point of the First Amendment is to 
afford individuals protection against infringements.”). See also Sorrell v. IMS, 564 U.S. 552, 
580 (2011) (recognizing that an individual’s right to speak is implicated when government 
regulates the commercial use of medical information by data miners and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers). 
 48 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion). 
 49 Id. at 203 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 
493 (1985)). 
 50 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
 51 Id. at 21. 
 52 Id. at 25. 
 53 See id. at 24–25. 
 54 Id. 
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places on governmental interference in the arena of public discussion.55 
These restraints, the Court said, place the “decision as to what views 
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us.”56 Because the 
Court recognized the right of individuals to decide the form, content, 
and emotive intent of their expression, Cohen’s use of the four-letter 
expletive was protected even though others found its use immoral.57 
The Court stated that “no other approach would comport with the 
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political 
system rests.”58 
The First Amendment doctrine applied in Cohen was largely 
developed by liberals who wanted to expand free speech protection 
for unpopular individuals and groups.59 Cases brought against govern-
mental attempts to restrict union picketing,60 anti-Vietnam War protests 
by students,61 flag-burning,62 and Nazi protests63 helped to “establish 
free speech as an essential protection for people with minority opinions 
who were in danger of being silenced by the majority.”64 While this 
doctrine was developed decades prior to Roberts’ tenure, a study 
prepared for the New York Times found his Court is now using the 
doctrine to champion conservative speech at a far greater rate than 
 
 55 Id. at 24. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at 24, 26. 
 58 Id. at 24. 
 59 Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-su-
preme-court.html. 
 60 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding the Constitutionally protected free-
doms of speech and of the press guaranteed the liberty to disseminate information 
concerning a labor dispute, overcoming the insufficiently serious or imminent dangers of 
breach of the peace or injury to a business interest which the State sought to protect). 
 61 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students’ 
wearing of black armbands were “closely akin to pure speech” and therefore entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment). 
 62 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the flag burning constituted 
symbolic political expression, and was, therefore, constitutionally protected). 
 63 Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (holding that the 
Illinois courts’ refusal to allow a stay of injunction against a planned Nazi demonstration 
effectively imposed a restraint on free speech), aff’d in part on remand, 373 N.E.2d 21 
(Ill. 1978). 
 64 Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 33. 
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liberal speech.65 From 2005 to 2018, sixty-nine percent of the conserva-
tive speech cases heard by the Roberts Court received a favorable 
ruling, compared to a win rate of twenty-one percent for cases 
involving liberal speech.66 This gap is striking when compared to other 
Courts, beginning with the Warren Court in 1953. Even the Burger 
Court,67 which had the second largest gap between rulings on con-
servative versus liberal speech cases, produced a liberal speech win 
rate of forty-seven percent—more than double the current Court’s—
and a conservative success rate of seventy percent, just one point 
higher than the current Court’s.68 These findings compared favorably 
to the percent of conservative speech cases accepted for review by 
the Roberts Court.69 Of all the free speech petitions accepted by the 
current Court, sixty-five percent involved the suppression of conserva-
tive expression.70 By comparison, the next highest rate of acceptance 
for conservative speech cases was that of the Rehnquist Court at 
forty-seven percent.71 
Armed with this traditional individual rights approach, the Rob-
erts Court has stuck down restraints on the creation of videos de-
picting animal cruelty;72 the sale of violent video games to minors;73 
 
 65 Liptak, supra note 59; see also Lee Epstein et al., 6+ Decades of Freedom of Expression 
in the U.S. Supreme Court 1, 1 (June 30, 2018), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/FreedomO-
fExpression.pdf. 
 66 Liptak, supra note 59. 
 67 The Burger Court succeeded the Warren Court in 1969 and lasted through 1986. See 
Epstein et al., supra note 65, at 3 for a table of Chief Justice Terms. 
 68 See Figure 7a of id. at 13 for win rates. 
 69 Id. at 9. 
 70 Id. at 9–10. 
 71 Id. at 10. 
 72 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding that 18 U.S.C. £ 48 limiting 
video depictions of extreme animal cruelty is substantially overbroad and therefore invalid 
under the First Amendment). 
 73 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (holding that video games 
qualify for First Amendment protection). 
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falsely claiming the Medal of Honor award;74 access to social network-
ing sites by sex offenders;75 hateful protests at military funerals;76 and 
corporate spending limits in candidate elections.77 In doing so, the 
Court has declined to consider the value of the expression at issue 
against its societal costs.78 In a particularly gut-wrenching free speech 
case involving the Westboro Baptist Church, an organization known 
for picketing military funerals with antigay placards,79 Chief Justice 
Roberts recognized both the extreme distress speech can inflict on 
others and the shackles the First Amendment places on government 
action against such speech. “Speech,” Roberts wrote, “is power. It can 
stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, 
and—as it did here—inflict great pain.”80 But even in light of great 
agony, Roberts continued, the First Amendment does not allow us to 
respond by punishing the speaker.81 “As a Nation,” he said, “we have 
chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public 
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”82 
By siding with speech interests in these high-profile rulings 
involving hateful expression, the Roberts Court has earned a reputation 
for dramatically expanding the reach of the First Amendment83 
through an approach that, according to Professor Burt Neuborne,84 
 
 74 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act 
constituted a content-based restriction on free speech in violation of the First Amendment). 
 75 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that a North Carolina 
statute prohibiting sex offenders from accessing social networking websites violated the 
First Amendment). 
 76 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding that hurtful speech on public issues, 
such as picketers protesting near a funeral military service, is protected under the First 
Amendment). 
 77 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that a federal statute barring 
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First 
Amendment). 
 78 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
 79 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448. 
 80 Id. at 460–61. 
 81 Id. at 461. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Laurence Tribe, Free Speech and the Roberts Court: Uncertain Protections, WASH. 
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 3, 2014, 8:46 AM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/03/free-speech-and-the-roberts-court-uncer-
tain-protections/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fb9f46fadb32. 
 84 Professor of Civil Liberties at New York University School of Law, founding Legal 
Director of Brennan Center for Justice, and National Legal Director of the ACLU from 
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seeks to “get the government out of the business of meddling with 
speech.”85 With an apparent aim of expanding the supply of ideas 
and voices in the marketplace, the Court is reshaping the First 
Amendment in ways that some worry will end up “creating a doctrine 
that simply doesn’t cohere.” 86 Others, however, praise the Court for 
its commitment to free speech principles in tough cases87 involving 
the types of unpopular and distasteful speech that require the most 
First Amendment protection.88 “On [this] score,” Floyd Abrams said, “no 
prior Supreme Court has been [more] protective.”89  
The Roberts Court’s protective stance toward repugnant messages 
and ideas rests on the idea that the Constitution forecloses any 
attempt to restrict speech simply on the basis that the expression lacks 
societal value.90 This line of thinking was most notable in a case 
involving the criminalization of the commercial creation, sale, or pos-
session of depictions of animal cruelty in which a “living animal is 
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.”91 In 
United States v. Stevens, the government argued that such depictions 
of animal cruelty should be treated as a new category of unprotected 
speech.92 The Roberts Court firmly rejected the idea. “[A]s a general 
matter,” the Court said, “the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content.”93 The fact that the government was 
arguing for a “free floating test” extending First Amendment protec-
tion “to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of 
 
1981–86. Burt Neuborne, NYU L.: FAC., http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseac-
tion=profile.biography&personid=20165 (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
 85 Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 33. 
 86 Tribe, supra note 83. 
 87 Michael W. McConnell, A Free Speech Year at the Court: A Survey of the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 Decisions, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2011), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/10/a-
free-speech-year-at-the-court. 
 88 Tribe, supra note 83. 
 89 Id. (Floyd Abrams is a nationally recognized attorney who has litigated countless First 
Amendment cases, including high profile cases before the Supreme Court. Floyd Abrams, 
CAHILL GORDAN & REINDEL LLP, https://www.cahill.com/professionals/floyd-abrams (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2019)). 
 90 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
 91 Id. at 464–65 (quoting 18 U.S.C. £ 48(c)(1)). 
 92 Id. at 469. 
 93 Id. at 468 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
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[their] relative social costs and benefits” was “startling and dangerous.”94 
“The First Amendment itself,” the Court said, “reflects a judgment by 
the American people that the benefits of its restriction on government 
outweigh the costs” and prohibits any attempts to “revise that judg-
ment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”95 
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND REGULATORY POLICY 
The Roberts Court has extended its speech-protective stance to 
economic regulatory policy aimed at corporate, professional, and com-
mercial speech.96 The Court most notably started down this path with 
its 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. FEC.97 In that ruling, the Court 
effectively prohibited the suppression of free speech rights based on 
a speaker’s wealth, or the correlation between the public’s support for 
an idea and the amount of money used to express it.98 The Citizens 
United ruling, which allows corporations to spend unlimited amounts 
of money on elections, reiterated a key holding in First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti99—that “political speech does not lose its First 
Amendment protection `simply because its source is a corporation.’”100 
Following the Citizens United decision, the Court focused its individual 
rights argument on regulatory policies which inhibit or compel an 
organization’s expressive activities.101 The Court’s approach strengthened 
the free speech rights of corporations and other business entities while 
broadening what it deemed content-based restrictions to include sub-
ject, topic, and speaker-based regulations.102 The Court has also ex-
tended a heightened scrutiny review to regulations that burden speech 
in pursuit of collective policy aims.103  
Members of the Court employed this approach (as well as 
longstanding constitutional principles that prohibit the restriction of 
offensive speech) to strike down a clause in federal trademark law 
 
 94 Id. at 470. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See infra text accompanying notes 97–195. 
 97 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 98 Id. at 351. 
 99 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 100 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784). 
 101 See infra text accompanying notes 104–67. 
 102 See infra text accompanying notes 104–67. 
 103 See infra text accompanying notes 104–67. 
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that prohibited the registration of marks that disparage members of 
a racial or ethnic group.104 That case, Matal v. Tam, is significant in 
part because the government has long maintained greater power to 
regulate expression connected to business and commercial activities.105 
The inherent profit motive in commercial information has largely 
prevented it from receiving the same degree of First Amendment 
protection afforded to non-commercial speech.106 Preceding courts have 
partly based this standard on the idea that profit-driven speech is 
hardier than other classes of non-commercial speech.107 Since commer-
cial speakers are economically motived to engage in speech, they are 
deemed more able to withstand regulatory restrictions than other 
speakers.108 Consequently, past courts gave the government more leeway 
in regulating commercial speech.109 In doing so, restrictions on com-
mercial speech were subjected to a lower degree of judicial scrutiny 
than restrictions on political speech.110 This lower degree of scrutiny 
was easier for the government to surmount than the strict scrutiny 
that courts apply to content-based regulations of non-commercial 
speech.111  
Eight members of the Court, writing in two separate opinions, 
largely circumvented the lower scrutiny rationale by concluding the 
restriction at issue in Matal constituted viewpoint discrimination even 
though the government applied the clause equally to marks arrayed 
on both sides of every possible issue.112 In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy wrote that “discrimination based on viewpoint, including a 
regulation that targets speech for its offensiveness, remains of serious 
 
 104 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). At issue in Matal v. Tam was the denial of an 
application for federal trademark registration of a dance-rock band’s name, “The Slants.” 
Id. at 1751. While the Patent and Trademark Office found that the word “slants” is a 
derogatory term for person of Asian descent, the band’s members wanted to use the slur 
as the name of their group in an attempt to reclaim the word and drain it of its 
denigrating force. Id. 
 105 See, e.g., Whitmore, supra note 36, at 39–45. 
 106 Id. at 39. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id. at 40–45. 
 110 See id. at 41. 
 111 Id. at 47. 
 112 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion); id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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concern in commercial context.”113 He explained that irrespective of 
whether the expression at issue in the case was categorized as com-
mercial speech, the statute’s viewpoint-based discrimination invoked 
heightened scrutiny.114 A plurality of justices, which included the Chief 
Justice, appeared to agree. The plurality explained that the disparage-
ment clause, which “denies registration to any mark that is offensive 
to a substantial percentage of the members of any group,” discrimi-
nates on the basis of viewpoint.115 “Giving offense,” the plurality said, 
“is a viewpoint.”116 Echoing language that evoked Cohen v. California,117 
the plurality said that the government does not have a legitimate 
interest in preventing offensive speech because such an intention  
. . . strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any 
other similar ground is hateful, but the proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express the thought that 
we hate.118 
While the plurality expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s 
attempt to cleanse the commercial marketplace of any expression likely 
to offend,119 it stopped short of resolving the dispute between the 
parties of whether trademarks are commercial speech, and thus re-
viewable under the more relaxed scrutiny standard outlined in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.120 Instead, 
the plurality argued that the disparagement clause was far too broad 
to “withstand even Central Hudson review,” which holds that the 
restriction must be narrowly drawn to further a substantial govern-
ment interest.121 In Matal, the government analogized disparaging trade-
marks to discriminatory conduct.122 Since such conduct has an adverse 
effect on commerce, the government argued that the clause was 
needed to protect the orderly flow of commerce.123 The plurality 
 
 113 Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1763 (plurality opinion). 
 116 Id. 
 117 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971). 
 118 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (plurality opinion). 
 119 Id. at 1765. 
 120 Id. at 1764 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 564–65 (1980)). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
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found the government’s attempt to drive out discriminatory trademarks 
far too expansive as the clause targeted any mark disparaging a 
person, group, or institution.124 The plurality labeled the disparagement 
clause of the Trademark Act a “happy-talk clause” and warned that 
free speech would be endangered if a commercial label permitted 
“suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social `vola-
tility.’”125 
The Roberts Court continued to elevate the level of scrutiny 
economic-based policies receive by expanding the definition of content-
based to take into consideration the purpose for which the information 
was being used.126 This allowed the Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health to 
protect a drug company’s ability to use pharmaceutical prescriber data 
for marketing purposes.127 At issue in Sorrell was a state restriction 
on the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmaceutical prescription records 
for marketing purposes.128 The regulation, which was intended to 
protect medical privacy and the integrity of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, targeted records that identified the prescriber.129 Prior to the 
enactment of the law, pharmacies sold these records to data companies, 
which in turn developed reports on the prescribing practices of doctors 
and then sold that information to pharmaceutical manufacturers for 
use in their marketing efforts.130  
While pharmaceutical manufacturers were prohibited from using 
the data for marketing purposes, the information could be provided 
to other entities for use in a variety of contexts such as medical 
research, law enforcement and compliance efforts, care management, 
and prescription drug educational programs.131 The Court concluded 
that the statute was content-based because it disfavored information 
used for marketing purposes, and therefore held it was also speaker-
based because it disfavored pharmaceutical manufacturers and mar-
keters.132 Laws that impose a direct burden on speech, the Court ruled, 
require heightened scrutiny even in cases involving commercial or 
 
 124 Id. at 1764–65. 
 125 Id. at 1765. 
 126 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–65 (2011). 
 127 Id. at 557. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 572. 
 130 Id. at 557–58. 
 131 Id. at 559–60. 
 132 Id. at 563–64. 
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economically motivated speech.133 The Court reasoned that these speak-
ers were prohibited from conveying information in their possession134 
because that information would be used for commercial purposes.135 
The Court noted that the speech at issue in Sorrell was no different 
than a “great deal of vital expression” that results from an economic 
motivation.136 Ultimately, the Court struck down the regulation under 
a more relaxed standard of review137 while the dissent upheld the 
statute under a similar level of review.138 While the Court did not 
define its interpretation of “heightened” scrutiny, its movement away 
from a strict two-tiered system (which reserves full First Amendment 
protection for political, social, and other noncommercial expression, 
and less protection for speech in the marketplace for goods and 
services) is viewed by some as a marked expansion of First Amend-
ment protection for commercial speech.139  
In its extension of heightened First Amendment scrutiny into 
the professional arena, the Court took special aim at regulations that 
compelled individuals to convey messages with which they disagreed.140 
The first case involved a disclosure regulation requiring California’s 
crisis pregnancy centers to post a government-scripted notice, that 
informed clients of state-sponsored free or low-cost health and abortion 
services.141 The notice also provided the contact information for the 
state-run facilities.142 The Ninth Circuit ruled for the government after 
applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to the compelled disclosure 
 
 133 Id. at 566. 
 134 Id. at 568. 
 135 Id. at 562. 
 136 Id. at 567. 
 137 Id. at 571–72. 
 138 Id. at 601. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 139 See Rich Samp, Supreme Court’s ‘Sorrell v. IMS Health’ Ruling Gains Traction in the 
Federal Appeals Courts, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2016/01/21/supreme-courts-sorrell-v-ims-health-ruling-gains-
traction-in-the-federal-appeals-courts/#50f5b8817f59. 
 140 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Janus v. 
AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 141 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 142 Id. at 2368, 2371. 
WHITMORE RTP.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/20  11:18 AM 
2020] EXTENDING THE ROBERTS COURT’S AFFIRMATION 121 
notice, given its determination that the speech at issue was “profes-
sional speech.”143 The Roberts Court countered that professional speech 
is not a separate category of expression that can be subjected to a 
diminished scope of First Amendment protection.144 The Court, it said, 
has afforded less protection to professional speech in only two regu-
latory circumstances: 1) the mandated disclosure of factual, noncontro-
versial information in the context of commercial speech; and 2) 
professional conduct restrictions that incidentally burden speech,145 such 
as requiring physicians to obtain informed consent before performing 
an abortion.146 The Court said that neither of these types of regulations 
were at issue in Becerra.147 Outside of these two contexts, the Court 
explained, precedents have applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws 
that regulate professional speech.148 In the opinion, the Court stressed 
that because professionals and government disagree on many topics, 
the government’s desire “to suppress unpopular ideas or information” 
does not wane when it is regulating professional speech.149 Government 
policies that restrict the content of professional speech pose the same 
inherent dangers to the free functioning of the marketplace of ideas 
as regulations on nonprofessional speech.150 Moreover, professional 
speech as a category is hard to define with precision and could be 
read to cover a wide array of individuals, making it ripe for selective 
restrictions on expression.151  
In the end, the Court found that it did not need to apply strict 
scrutiny because the compelled notice requirement could not withstand 
an intermediate scrutiny review as the requirement was “wildly un-
derinclusive.”152 California asserted that its interest was to provide low-
income women with information about the state-supported service; but 
the notice requirement did not apply to all health providers that 
 
 143 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the notice is subject to intermediate scrutiny), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of 
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 144 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72. 
 145 Id. at 2372. 
 146 Id. at 2373. 
 147 Id. at 2372. 
 148 Id. at 2374. 
 149 See id. at 2374–75 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FEC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 2375. 
 152 Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)). 
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offer family planning or pregnancy-related services to low-income 
women.153  
In a similar but even more controversial vein, the Court applied 
“exacting” scrutiny to a challenge involving mandatory support of 
collective bargaining efforts by public-sector employees.154 In Janus v. 
AFSCME, a state employee declined to join the union and strongly 
objected to the union’s espoused positions in collective bargaining and 
related activities.155 Focusing on the employee’s free speech right, the 
Court found the required fee payment to the union particularly 
onerous because it forced individuals to “mouth support for views 
they find objectionable.”156 “Forcing free and independent individuals 
to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning,”157 the 
Court said. Here, government employees were compelled to support a 
private expressive organization whose speech activities covered im-
portant public matters such as the state’s budget problems and issues 
related to education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights.158 
The Court used this reasoning to reconsider and overrule Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education,159 a case that found collective bargaining 
activities less violative of free speech rights than other more direct 
political activities in which the union engaged.160 The Court applied 
exacting scrutiny to the issues raised in Abood and ruled that the 
interests for upholding a mandatory fee on non-union employees were 
unfounded.161 In Abood, the State asserted that the agency fee ar-
rangement was necessary to maintain “labor peace” and to prevent 
 
 153 Id. at 2375–76. 
 154 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464–65 (2018). 
 155 Id. at 2461. 
 156 Id. at 2463–64. 
 157 Id. at 2464. 
 158 Id. at 2474–75. 
 159 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2448. 
 160 See id. at 235–36 (noting the difficulty in “drawing lines between collective-bargaining, 
for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective 
bargaining, for which compulsion is prohibited.”) (emphasis added). 
 161 In Janus, the Court explained that exacting scrutiny is a less demanding test than 
strict scrutiny. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. Under exacting scrutiny, the regulation must “serve 
a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less 
restrictive” of First Amendment freedoms. Id. (quoting Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 
298, 310 (2012)). Under strict scrutiny, the government also must show that the regulation 
serves a compelling interest and the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the interest. 
When applying strict scrutiny, a court may strike down a regulation if there are less 
speech-restrictive alternatives available that would achieve the interest essentially as well 
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“free riding” by nonmembers of the union.162 The Janus Court found 
that while labor peace is a compelling state interest, it has been 
achieved in unions where nonmembers are not required to pay an 
agency fee.163 “It is now undeniable,” the Court said, “that `labor peace’ 
can be achieved `through means significantly less restrictive of [First 
Amendment rights]’ than the assessment of agency fees.”164 As for free 
riding, the Court ruled that avoiding free riders is not a compelling 
interest.165 As a result, the holding in Abood was declared unconstitu-
tional.166 With the precedential decision overruled, the Court held that 
the extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector em-
ployees violates the First Amendment and that Abood erred in con-
cluding otherwise.167 
III. THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST APPROACH 
In these three professional and commercial speech cases, the 
Court’s liberal wing took issue with the application of a heightened 
standard of review to regulatory programs.168 In Sorrell, the dissent 
noted that the Court had never used the categories of content-based 
or speaker-based to justify greater scrutiny of regulatory activities that 
affect commercial speech.169 Regulatory programs, the dissent explained, 
commonly draw distinctions based on content and the class of the 
entities regulated.170 For this reason, a more lenient and deferential 
approach was applied to ordinary commercial or regulatory legislation 
that affected speech in less direct ways.171 To apply a strict First 
Amendment analysis as a matter of course to ordinary economic 
programs is unprecedented, the dissenters explained, and threatens to 
 
as the speech restriction. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring 
and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996). 
 162 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 224). 
 163 Id. at 2465–66. 
 164 Id. at 2466 (quoting Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 648–49 (2014)). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 2486. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 2491–92 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 
587–88 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 169 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 588 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor joined the 
majority opinion. Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined the dissent. 
 170 Id. at 589. 
 171 Id. at 584. 
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open a “Pandora’s Box” of litigation against regulatory practices that 
“only incidentally affect a commercial message.”172  
This argument was echoed in the dissent in National Institute 
of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra.173 The four dissenters warned 
that the Court’s constitutional approach “threatens to create serious 
problems” due to the central role speech plays in human behavior 
and the regulation of that behavior.174 While the Court recognized 
two exceptions to its broad-based First Amendment analysis,175 the 
dissent noted that many ordinary disclosure laws fall outside those 
exceptions and that, if taken literally, “every disclosure law could be 
considered content-based, for virtually every disclosure law requires 
individuals to speak a particular message.”176 This approach, the dissent 
noted, could “radically change prior law” by threatening the constitu-
tionality of laws that protect consumers and govern the securities 
industry.177 This threat was made more acute, the dissent said, by the 
2015 decision Reed v. Town of Gilbert, where the Court expanded 
the definition of content-based to include topic or subject-based dis-
tinctions in addition to the traditionally defined viewpoint-based dis-
crimination.178 According to the dissent in Becerra, the majority’s broad 
content-based test creates an unpredictable First Amendment standard 
that courts may use to strike down health and safety warnings as 
well as other routine economic and social legislation long thought to 
raise little constitutional concern.179  
The alarm raised in Becerra was largely replicated in a four-
member dissent that was written by Justice Elena Kagan in Janus v. 
AFSCME.180 In the dissent, Kagan accused the Court of “weaponizing” 
the First Amendment in order to “pick the winning side in what 
 
 172 Id. at 602. 
 173 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 174 Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor joined 
the dissent. 
 175 See id. (stating that the majority: (1) excepts laws that “require professionals to disclose 
factual, noncontroversial information in their commercial speech, provided that the disclo-
sure relates to the services that the regulated entities provide[,]” and (2) “excepts laws that 
regulate professional conduct and only incidentally burden speech.”). 
 176 Id. (citation omitted). 
 177 Id. 
 178 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 179 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 180 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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should be . . . an energetic policy debate.”181 Kagan noted that a 
healthy debate over workplace governance had ensued for decades, 
resulting in splits among state and local governments (and their 
constituents) on the value of public-sector unions.182 By stepping into 
this debate and using the First Amendment as a “sword” against a 
workaday policy,183 Kagan charged the majority with undermining the 
democratic process.184 The First Amendment, she said, was not meant 
to be used in such an aggressive manner against commonplace regu-
lations that implicate speech activities.185 Since almost all economic and 
regulatory policy involves speech, she warned that the Court’s approach 
will allow judges to interfere in democratically constructed policy for 
a long time to come.186 The majority’s approach, she said, “runs long” 
and allows the Justices at every stop to override the will of the 
people.187 
In many ways, the gulf between the Roberts Court’s conservative 
majority and liberal minority stems from the lens through which they 
view the First Amendment and its primary role in a democratic 
system. In adjudicating challenges to economic and regulatory prob-
lems, the liberals contend that collective speech matters because it 
forms the public’s opinion which influences elected representatives and 
prompts government action.188 The First Amendment, they argue, fa-
cilitates and protects this expressive activity so that economic and 
regulatory policy reflects the very thoughts, views, ideas, sentiments, 
and choices of the citizens engaged in democratic governance.189 The 
majority’s application of heightened scrutiny to ordinary social and 
economic legislation dilutes these goals190 and prevents the American 
people, acting through their state and local officials, from making 
important choices about regulatory policy.191 Instead, they contend that 
strict scrutiny should be reserved for factual situations where it is 
 
 181 Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 2502. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 236–37 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189 Id. at 238. See also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 190 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382–83 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 191 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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“realistically possible” that “[g]overnment may effectively drive certain 
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”192 While the Roberts Court 
recognizes the First Amendment serves important collective interests, 
it contends that those interests are undermined and the marketplace 
inhibited from reflecting the true sentiments of the American people 
when individuals are not allowed to express their beliefs, or are 
compelled to voice ideas with which they disagree.193 Moreover, Roberts 
has pointed to the fact that laws, which are viewed as reflecting the 
collective interest, include legislation that restricts or compels speech.194 
The First Amendment, he argued, affords individuals protection against 
such laws regardless of whether government is reflecting collective 
speech through its legislative endeavor.195 
IV. APPLICATION TO MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
Masterpiece Cakeshop challenges both concepts of First Amend-
ment law. Here, Phillips violated Colorado’s public accommodations 
law.196 The law regulates the conduct of shopkeepers and other busi-
nesses by requiring them to provide equal access to gay persons in 
acquiring the same goods and services as offered to other members 
of the public.197 In short, the law is an economic and regulatory 
policy that reflects the collective interest in equal treatment—but 
when applied to Phillips, it required him to use his expressive talents 
to create custom wedding cakes for same-sex couples. When Phillips 
creates a custom wedding cake, he reportedly works closely with the 
couple, “discuss[ing] their preferences, [] personalities, and [] details of 
their wedding to ensure that [the] cake reflects the couple who 
ordered it.”198 To that end, he sketches out the design on paper, 
chooses a color scheme, creates the frosting and decorations, bakes, 
sculpts, and delivers the cake to the wedding.199 To Phillips, a custom 
 
 192 Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined the concurrence. 
 193 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463–64; Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75. 
 194 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 205–06 (plurality opinion). The plurality included Justices 
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Alito. Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence. Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan dissented. 
 195 Id. at 206. 
 196 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
 197 Id. at 1725. 
 198 Id. at 1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 199 Id. at 1742. 
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wedding cake is inherently expressive—it communicates that “a wed-
ding has occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should be 
celebrated.”200 Viewed in this context, the State’s order conflicted with 
Phillips’ religious belief that “God’s intention for marriage from the 
beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one 
man and one woman,” and forced him to express a message contrary 
to that belief through his custom cakes.201 
While the Roberts Court has not decided a case factually similar 
to Masterpiece Cakeshop, it has extended First Amendment protection 
to a variety of economic and regulatory activities to include the 
creation and sale of videos depicting animal cruelty;202 registration of 
trademarks;203 marketing of prescriber information;204 compelled disclo-
sure of low-cost health services;205 and mandatory payment of union 
dues.206 In doing so, the Court affirmed the value of individual 
expression stemming from the economic marketplace, noted the vital 
role such speech plays in public debate, and highlighted the burden 
that regulations place on it.207 Viewing Masterpiece Cakeshop from 
this vantage point, it seems safe to conclude that the Court would 
seriously consider Phillips’ First Amendment claim. To determine 
whether Phillips’ cake designing and baking activities constitute pro-
tected speech, the Court would need to examine whether Phillips 
intended to convey a particular message with his custom design, and 
whether the likelihood is great that those who view it will understand 
the message.208 Given the exceptional care Phillips takes with his 
custom wedding cakes, it is fairly clear that he intends to construct 
an aesthetic message through the design. Whether the Roberts Court 
will find that, in the context of a wedding, the likelihood is great 
that those who view the cake will understand its expressive message 
remains an open question.209 In the opinion, the Court noted that the 
 
 200 Id. at 1743. 
 201 Id. at 1724 (majority opinion). 
 202 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 203 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 204 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 205 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 206 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 207 See supra text accompanying notes 96–167. 
 208 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (discussing the criteria for which 
nonverbal activity may become protected expression). 
 209 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (considering 
whether the hosting of military recruiters by law schools was expressive conduct). The 
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free speech aspect of the case is especially challenging because a 
likelihood exists that a “few [people] who have seen a beautiful 
wedding cake might” view its creation as an exercise of protected 
speech.210  
The Court’s observation is notable given that a unanimous Court 
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston recognized the role the audience plays in the construction of 
aesthetic messages.211 There, the Court ruled that the South Boston 
Allied War Veterans Council was “speaking” when it approved the 
groups that could participate in their parade.212 The speech act rested 
on the idea that the Council made some sort of collective point 
because each parade unit chosen was “understood to contribute some-
thing to a common theme.”213 This collective point was not just 
conveyed among the marchers, but it was also communicated to the 
spectators, who assigned their own meaning to the parade.214 In this 
regard, “the parade’s overall message . . . [arose] from the individual 
presentations along the way” and how these expressive presentations 
were collectively “perceived by spectators.”215 The viewers, then, pro-
vided the meaning and message of the Council’s speech through their 
own insights and imagination.216 “Since every participating unit af-
fect[ed] the message conveyed,” and therefore the message received, 
the Court reasoned that the state court’s mandated inclusion of the 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (“GLIB”) 
among the parade participants altered the Council’s expressive con-
tent.217  
The Hurley Court also pointed out that a “succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition” for First Amendment protection218 and 
that the message excluded from the parade was “not difficult to 
 
Court ruled that the legislation, which tied federal funding to equal access to campus 
facilities by military recruiters, regulated conduct—not speech. Id. at 65–66. 
 210 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
 211 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 212 Id. at 574–75. 
 213 Id. at 576. 
 214 Id. at 568. 
 215 Id. at 577. 
 216 RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH 139 (2012). 
 217 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–73. 
 218 Id. at 569. 
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identify.”219 According to the Court, a unit marching behind a GLIB 
banner “would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are 
gay, lesbian, or bisexual[;]”220 while also suggesting that the Council 
agrees that GLIB “have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance” 
as the other parade participants.221 The Court noted that the parade’s 
organizers may object to these facts and beliefs “or have some other 
reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade.”222 This 
argument was embraced by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch in a sepa-
rate concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop.223 Forcing Phillips to make 
custom wedding cakes for same-sex marriages, Thomas wrote, requires 
him to bear witness to facts and suggestions with which he disagrees.224 
First, such a mandate would force him to acknowledge that same-sex 
marriage ceremonies are in fact weddings.225 Second, it would suggest 
that Phillips espouses the idea that same-sex weddings should be 
celebrated.226 Thomas noted that Phillips believes his faith forbids both 
of these messages.227  
While Justices Thomas and Gorsuch argued that the custom 
wedding cake at issue constituted an expressive act,228 Justice Gorsuch, 
in a separate concurrence joined by Justice Alito, expressed concern 
with how the Commission differentiated between cakes with and 
without words when it came to granting First Amendment protec-
tion.229 The argument in the latter concurrence harkens back to a 
four-member dissent in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, written by 
Justice Alito.230 At issue was a law school’s nondiscrimination policy 
which allowed student organizations to limit membership to individuals 
who agreed with the group’s secular viewpoint, but prohibited religious 
groups from excluding members who did not share their convictions.231 
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The Christian Legal Society held the viewpoint that sexual conduct 
outside of a marriage between a man and a woman was improper.232 
By singling out one category of expressive association for disfavored 
treatment, the dissent found that the law school engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination.233 Gorsuch expressed a similar argument in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, arguing that the Commission failed to apply the law in a 
neutral manner.234 In a case involving William Jack, who attempted 
to purchase cakes with messages that disapproved of same-sex marriage 
on religious grounds, the Commission allowed the bakers to deny 
creating the cakes because the cakes Jack sought were offensive to 
their moral convictions.235 The bakers also said that they would provide 
religious persons with cakes expressing other ideas.236 While Phillips 
made a similar argument,237 the Commission presumed that Phillips 
intended to discriminate against a protected class.238 Justice Gorsuch 
argued that the Commission must either require actual proof of intent 
to discriminate (as in Jack’s case) or presume intent from the knowing 
refusal of service to someone in a protected class (as in Phillips’ 
case).239 “[T]he Commission could have chosen either course,” Gorsuch 
wrote.240 “But the one thing it can’t do is apply a more generous 
legal test to secular objections than religious ones.”241 
In its opinion, the Colorado Court of Appeals viewed the law 
differently and rejected Phillips’ free speech argument.242 The court 
concluded that the “act of designing and selling a wedding cake to 
all customers free of discrimination does not convey a celebratory 
message about same-sex weddings likely to be understood by those 
who view it.”243 The court reasoned that to the extent the public 
infers a message celebrating same-sex marriage from the cake, the 
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“message is more likely to be attributed to the customer than to 
Masterpiece.”244 The court pointed out that because the Cakeshop 
charges it customers for baked goods, a reasonable observer would 
conclude that the bakery is merely conducting its business in accord-
ance with the state’s public accommodations law.245 In this way, the 
Colorado court said Masterpiece Cakeshop differs from Hurley, where 
given the expressive nature of a parade, “spectators [are more] likely 
[to] attribute each marcher’s message to the parade[‘s] organizers.”246  
The question of whether Phillips’ cake designing and baking 
activities would be perceived by reasonable observers as signaling 
support for same-sex marriage is certainly arguable, but not incon-
ceivable, given the increasing involvement of the business community 
in the realm of public debate. Corporations, associations, and businesses 
from the powerful to the mom-and-pop have openly taken stances 
on divisive social issues such as gun violence, capital punishment, 
political ideology, and LGBT rights.247 Dick’s Sporting Goods made 
headlines when the company’s CEO, Edward W. Stack, announced 
after the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, that the retailer would 
no longer sell assault weapons, high-capacity magazines, or guns to 
customers under the age of twenty-one.248 Stack also implored elected 
officials to enact common sense gun reform and outlined several 
specific measures Congress needed to enact.249 The tragedy in Parkland 
also prompted a number of companies to cut ties with the National 
Rifle Association.250 For instance, Delta and United Airlines, several 
national car rental companies, security companies, and the insurer 
MetLife all stopped offering discounts and other promotions to NRA 
members.251 The First National Bank of Omaha discontinued offering 
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its NRA-branded Visa credit card to customers.252 Pharmaceutical giant 
Pfizer refused to sell drugs used in lethal injections to state prisons.253 
Chipotle terminated its sponsorship of a Boy Scout Jamboree because 
the organization’s stance on gay scout leaders conflicted with the 
company’s anti-discrimination policy.254 Stephanie Wilkinson, owner of 
the Red Hen (a tiny farm-to-table eatery in rural Virginia), asked 
President Trump’s Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, to leave 
the restaurant after her staff indicated they wanted her to do so.255 
Wilkinson based her decision on Sanders’ public defense of an “inhu-
mane and unethical” White House administration.256 “[T]he restaurant,” 
she said in a Washington Post interview, “has certain standards that 
I feel it has to uphold.”257 For Wilkinson, this feels like the right 
moment in the nation’s history for people to take uncomfortable 
actions to uphold their morals.258  
For some in the business community, upholding the company’s 
morals has translated into openly opposing limitations on the equal 
rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people. Multinational 
and national corporations and associations from Apple and Disney to 
the NFL and NBA have threatened to move resources, jobs, and 
money-making events from states that pass discriminatory measures.259 
In Indiana, the state’s passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act resulted in a loss of more than $60 million in future convention 
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business to the city of Indianapolis.260 The Act, which was viewed by 
supporters as a way to protect individuals and businesses with a 
religious objection to same-sex weddings,261 prompted travel bans from 
cities and states along with statements denouncing the measure from 
corporations, sports organizations, universities, and the like.262 The eco-
nomic pressure exerted on the State prompted the legislature to amend 
the Act shortly thereafter with language that prohibited the denial 
of service based on sexual orientation and gender identity.263 Indiana, 
however, is not alone. In 2016, North Carolina made headlines when 
its general assembly not only overturned a Charlotte city ordinance 
that banned discrimination against LGBT people, but also barred every 
city in the state from passing nondiscrimination regulations.264 The 
statute set off a fierce nationwide backlash that included boycotts by 
businesses, sports leagues, and musicians.265 Charlotte alone lost nearly 
$285 million and 1,300 jobs in addition to the cancelation of the 2017 
NBA All-Star Game, which was set to be hosted in the city.266  
As more businesses take stands on public issues, it raises the 
probability that a reasonable observer would infer that Phillips sup-
ports same-sex marriage by his involvement in the wedding reception. 
Moreover, the decisions discussed here suggest that the Court is de-
veloping a track record of acknowledging the speech interests at stake 
in commercial activities regulated by economic policy. This acknowl-
edgement underscores the free speech interests of the individual and 
the impact regulatory policy has on their freedom to say what they 
think or to refrain from voicing ideas with which they disagree.267 
Masterpiece Cakeshop fits into this body of law. Here, Phillips’ con-
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servative religious viewpoint is being altered to provide anti-discrimi-
nation protection for same-sex couples. Viewed through the lens of 
the Roberts Court’s decisions, the Commission’s order will most likely 
be subjected to a form of strict scrutiny–albeit heightened, exacting 
or strict–given that it “draws distinctions based on the message [Phil-
lips] conveys.”268 The fact that the speech occurs in the commercial 
realm or constitutes professional speech will not subject it to a lower 
level of First Amendment scrutiny.269 The Court has ruled that laws 
that impose a direct burden on speech require heightened scrutiny 
even in cases involving commercial270 or professional speech.271 Only 
laws that mandate disclosure of factual noncontroversial information 
in the context of commercial speech or professional conduct regula-
tions that incidentally burden speech are subject to a diminished 
scope of First Amendment protection.272 The fact that the expressive 
idea at issue may be demeaning or disparaging to a particular group 
will also not save it from heightened scrutiny—it will only make the 
case against its regulation stronger by implicating the bedrock principle 
prohibiting the restriction of speech on the grounds that it offends273 
as well as the Court’s ruling that “giving offense is viewpoint.”274 The 
same rings true for the fact that the regulation does not prevent the 
idea from entering the marketplace, but only compels adherence to a 
counter narrative in the marketplace of goods and services.275 The 
Court has explained that forced speech is “always demeaning” because 
it forces “free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find 
objectionable.”276 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the end, Masterpiece Cakeshop is perfectly positioned for the 
Roberts Court and the conflicting approaches to First Amendment 
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analysis between the conservative and liberal wings. Given the con-
servative majority, it stands to reason that an individual rights ap-
proach will win out over the call from the liberal minority for a 
First Amendment doctrine that leaves economic and regulatory laws 
which reflect the collective interest standing.277 That said, the Court 
lost one of its most speech-protective justices when Justice Anthony 
Kennedy stepped down at the end of the 2017–18 Term.278 Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh took his seat.279 Commentators argue that Kavanaugh’s 
“opinions are consistent with the Court’s strong protection of free 
speech rights” and make it very likely that Kennedy’s free speech 
legacy will survive.280 According to Professor Timothy Zick, Ka-
vanaugh’s record on free speech cases demonstrates a strong support 
for the speech rights of corporations.281 In this area, Kavanaugh has 
authored opinions on campaign finance282 and telecommunication reg-
ulation.283 In the area of campaign finance, he wrote that the First 
Amendment protects the “right of citizens to band together[,] . . . pool 
their resources,” and spend unlimited amounts of money “to express 
their views about policy issues and candidates for public office”284—
a stance in line with the Court’s Citizens United ruling.285  
On the telecommunications front, Kavanaugh likened an Internet 
service company’s right to control the speed and availability of the 
data it distributes to the editorial freedom of media companies.286 In 
 
 277 See, e.g., Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 278 Jonathan H. Adler, Judge Kavanaugh and Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Legacy, 
REASON (July 11, 2018, 10:43 PM), https://reason.com/2018/07/11/judge-kavanaugh-and-justice-
kennedys-fre/. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id.; Ken White, You’ll Hate This Post on Brett Kavanaugh and Free Speech, POPEHAT 
(July 10, 2018), https://www.popehat.com/2018/07/10/youll-hate-this-post-on-brett-kavanaugh-
and-free-speech/. 
 281 Timothy Zick, Judge Kavanaugh and Freedom of Expression, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 7, 
2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaugh-and-freedom-of-expres-
sion/. 
 282 See, e.g., Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 
2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d. 150 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 283 See, e.g., United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting); Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring); Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d. 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
 284 Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 4. 
 285 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
 286 United States Telecom, 855 F.3d at 430 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
WHITMORE RTP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/20  11:18 AM 
136 The Elon Law Journal [VOL. 12:1 
dissent, he argued that the FCC’s net neutrality rule violates the First 
Amendment because it restricts the editorial discretion of Internet 
service providers.287 Kavanaugh wrote: 
Absent a showing of market power[,] . . .  the Government may not tell 
Internet service providers how to exercise their editorial discretion about 
what content to carry or favor any more than the Government can tell 
Amazon or Politics & Prose what books to promote; or tell The Washington 
Post or the Drudge Report what columns to carry; or tell ESPN or the 
NFL Network what games to show.288  
Given his posture on regulatory law in the campaign finance 
and telecommunications areas, one commentator wrote that Kavanaugh 
would likely be viewed as an advocate for using the First Amendment 
as a “weapon” to strike down economic and regulatory policy.289  
It may not be long before we find out exactly how Justice 
Kavanaugh will rule on a case similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop. In 
October 2018, the Court was asked to review a case involving an 
Oregon couple’s refusal to make a custom wedding cake for a same-
sex couple.290 The owners of Sweetcakes by Melissa contend that the 
application of the State’s public accommodation statute to their custom 
wedding cake service compels them to express a celebratory message 
of same-sex marriage with which they disagree.291 Given the lens 
through which the Robert’s Court views free speech claims, the body 
of First Amendment precedent the Court has developed, and the five-
member conservative majority, it is highly likely that Sweetcakes by 
Melissa (or some other factually similar case) will confront a Court 
that is poised to carve out a free speech exception in public accom-
modation laws for individuals engaged in expressive commercial ac-
tivities that contend the law forces them to convey a recognizable 
aesthetic message with which they disagree. 
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